

Advancing Marriage Equality in 2012:

*The Impact and Efficacy of
Public Education Funding*

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Commissioned by Civil Marriage Collaborative

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Acronyms

501(c)(3) or “c3”	Refers to the permissive use of funds for public education or charitable purposes by entities designated under US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) codes as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization.
501(c)(4) or “c4”	Refers to the permissive use of funds for the promotion of social welfare, including lobbying and participation in political campaigns and elections by entities designated under the IRS codes as a 501(c)(4) nonprofit organization.
CMC	Civil Marriage Collaborative
CNC	Centralized National Capacity
COC	Communities of color
COF	Communities of faith
ERW	Equal Rights Washington
EMF	Equality Maryland Foundation
GRS	Grassroots Solutions
HRC	Human Rights Campaign
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
MDfME	Marylanders for Marriage Equality
MN United	Minnesotans United for All Families
MUFM	Mainers United for Marriage
WUFM	Washington United for Marriage
WMMM	Why Marriage Matters Maine 501(c)(3) public education campaign
WMMW	Why Marriage Matters Washington 501(c)(3) public education campaign

Introduction

November 6, 2012 was a historic day for America’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered community. For the first time in the history of this movement three states affirmed the freedom to marry by ballot referendum, while a fourth state rejected a ballot amendment to restrict marriage explicitly to heterosexual couples in its constitution.

Following the November elections, The Civil Marriage Collaborative and Freedom to Marry came together to explore how their collective work and experiences might inform the full range of future marriage equality efforts. What resulted from this conversation was the development of a broader, multi-pronged initiative to collect materials and learning that could inform both future advocacy and future funding through three distinct vantage points:

- The *Documentation* Phase undertaken by Freedom to Marry has resulted in the development of an extensive archive of public education and campaign materials.
- The *Analysis* Phase, undertaken by Grassroots Solutions under the guidance of Freedom to Marry captures strategic insights and lessons from the campaigns across a number of quantitative and qualitative areas as well as spanning the c3 and c4 spectrum.

The CMC and several of its funder members provided grants to Freedom to Marry to carry out these activities. For additional information on the 2012 Archive, as well as Grassroots Solution’s campaign analysis, please contact Freedom to Marry (www.freedomtomarry.org).

This document, commissioned by the Civil Marriage Collaborative, and supported with Ford Foundation and CMC funds, represents the project’s third phase, *Evaluation*.

Project Goal

This evaluation seeks to gain insight from public education funding of state-level initiatives to advance the freedom to marry. The report examines the impact and relevance of such 501(c)(3) funding, from the CMC and others on the arc of the marriage equality debate — including the closing chapter of those efforts

in the November 2012 ballot victories in Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, and Washington.

Methodology

This qualitative analysis assessed whether and how funding for non-lobbying public education, typically a c3 activity, affected the debate on marriage equality in the four states in question, including the eventual ability of the independent state campaigns to persuade voters, a c4 activity, on a ballot initiative for marriage equality. Source materials for this evaluation included:

Document and analysis review, including: CMC documents tied to its 501(c)(3) public education grants and charitable investments; campaign plans, fundraising materials, various reports, and accountings from each of the four states; and field and strategy analysis produced by Grassroots Solutions, Goodwin Simon, and other partner sources.

Key Advocates and Stakeholder Interviews: 27 formal interviews (a full listing of interviews can be found at the end of this report) as well as more than a dozen informal conversations with other advocates and informants. Interviews were conducted between January and April 2012 and were done on a not-for-attribution basis. Almost all these conversations were done by phone, and the staff of Grassroots Solutions participated in portions of a number of these calls.

Report Structure

Following a short presentation of findings, this report is divided into two sections. First, the 501(c)(3) funding in each of the four states is reviewed, including its sourcing, deployment, and to the extent possible, its many consequences. This is followed by a series of more general observations and recommendations from the perspective of the writer that could inform future funding of this work.

The Civil Marriage Collaborative

Founded in 2004, the Civil Marriage Collaborative is a unique effort to build and strengthen a broad and diverse grassroots constituency and a powerful public education apparatus to advance marriage equality for same-sex couples in the United States. The Collaborative supports comprehensive public education work at the state level to change hearts and minds and help create environments that can

lead to marriage equality in each state funded. To date, the Collaborative has invested \$17 million toward public education, research, polling, message development, grassroots and grass tops mobilization, and coalition-building activities in a total of 20 states and the District of Columbia.

Key Findings

Public Education effectively moves hearts and minds: In Maine and Washington, for example, polling data shows that c3 investments had significant impact on increasing public support for marriage from three to six points.

High impact Public Education takes time and is best begun early: Successful community-based education and relationship building took time, and was best done with c3 funds and in conjunction with movement-building and intersectional capacity and alliance building work. The sooner public education and relationship building could occur, the deeper and more lasting it became. Similarly, with early c3 funding, advocates could be more deliberate and strategic in their planning, and cost savings — especially in terms of media purchases — were realized.

Public Education funding in these states did not escape the challenges of turf and authority: How local leadership was empowered to be directive of program and funding, the license local groups were given by national funders and advocacy groups to carry out c3 activities, the validating role of national organizations and funders, and the real tensions created by organizational needs for attribution all directly impacted the efficacy of c3 funding.

Strategic, early funding was most effective: The most impactful public education work was heavily grounded in research and data, thoroughly tested, and specifically tailored for target constituencies within a state. Early, entrepreneurial funding that supported these explorations had a high future return.

Public Education messages and strategies had the highest impact if tailored to state values and delivered by local voices: State-specific research and data was critical. Adequate c3 funding afforded states the ability to do vital research and data collection that resulted in the most effective state and community specific messaging and engagement strategies.

Relationships are at the heart of changing hearts and minds: The most impactful public education work was grounded in relationships. This work was community based (especially in terms of faith and race/ethnicity), took time, and involved personal contacts, leadership and alliance building.

There are limits to what we could conclude about the 2012 c3 funding in the context of a state moving towards marriage equality: The state of Maine is one exception. In that state, c3 public education was conducted for three years before


organizing efforts around the ballot began. It was possible to align public education efforts in Maine with actual polling numbers and shifts in those numbers. More generally, however, the c3 strategies employed by the states were comingled with and impacted in the public space by current events, from in-state political factors to larger national influences. There is also the challenge of a dearth of real data — baseline polling in particular — from some of the target communities where significant c3 investments were made. While contributions of public education funding are clear, assigning direct attribution is far less achievable.

501(c)(3) Funding¹


Maine

Through Maine is a state with significant protections for LGBT people, it has a tortured 28-year history in this area. For example, it took repeated tries for anti-discrimination protections to pass and survive at the ballot box in 2005. One

**Maine Total Expenditures, 2010 to 2012:
\$8, 342,102**



Total C3 Funding, 2010 to 2012: \$3.54m



of the challenges is that Maine’s constitution allows for voters to veto a law passed by the legislature. On May 6, 2009, Maine won the freedom to marry, becoming the fifth state to win marriage for LGBT people at that time and the first state to win legislatively and have a governor sign the bill. Opponents of marriage equality placed the issue on the November 2009 ballot, the only state to do so that year.

Going into the fall election, opinion polls showed an evenly divided public. The referendum lost 52.8% to 47.3%. The loss of this hard-fought marriage law by “people’s veto” in 2009 made it clear to advocates that “all our assumptions about how to win campaigns needed to be re-evaluated.” Following this hard six-point ballot loss, advocates knew they needed to re-evaluate, re-test, and re-tool. For many, the closeness of the race

represented opportunity — that if they captured the lessons from 2009, and accessed the capacity to act upon them, a win at the ballot was achievable.

¹ “Total Campaign Expenditures” cited in this report were taken from each campaign’s final reports and accountings. Except in the case of Maryland, “Total c3 Campaign Funding” amounts are also presented as amounts reported by the campaigns.

Public Education Funding

Of all the four states examined, Maine provides the clearest opportunity to understand the impact of public education funding. From 2010 to early 2012, work in the state advancing marriage was done exclusively with c3 dollars. While mitigating factors like national media and other forms of external influence during this time period do play a part, it is clear that progress made to advance marriage equality during this time period can be primarily attributed to c3 investments.


Polling numbers provide clear insight about impact. As noted above, only 47% of Mainers voted in favor of marriage equality on the November 2009 ballot. *After a year and a half of intense c3 organizing, communications and fieldwork, polling in June 2011 revealed that support for the freedom to marry rose by six percentage points.* While polling numbers fluctuated during the subsequent months leading up to the election, this 53% base of support was maintained through to the November 2012 vote.

Maine also provides insights on the potential for leveraging impact that early funding represents. Almost half of the total c3 funding that went into the state — approximately \$1.5 million — was used to support work in 2010 and the first few months of 2011. The timeliness of this mostly unrestricted grant money afforded advocates the freedom and license to thoughtfully respond to the lessons of the 2009 efforts, and in turn, to engage in the research, outreach, public education, infrastructure and staffing, and strategizing necessary for success in both the state-wide conversation before the ballot battle was joined, and in the ballot effort itself.

For example, an extraordinary amount of Maine's outreach and organizing was done early and with c3 funds. A full one-third of the campaign's persuasion mail was sent between May 2010 and January 2012. Similarly, 90,000 field conversations conducted by the campaign prior to January 2012 were done with c3 money. Phone persuasion/public education on marriage began in March 2011 with c3 funds supporting extensive testing, retooling and implementation. Most of the expenses incurred in collecting the 105,000 signatures needed to qualify for the ballot were covered by public education dollars, using the H-election (that allows a c3 to apply a limited amount of its c3 funds towards lobbying activities.)

Sophisticated Spenders: The c3 Why Marriage Matters Maine, c3 grantee groups (Freedom to Marry, GLAD and Equality Maine) and the c4 Mainers United for Marriage worked together extremely well and were quite sophisticated in how to appropriately and effectively use c3 and c4 funding. Their knowledge of the legal

permissions and limitations of fund usage allowed them to seamlessly pivot from public education to ballot advocacy activities with minimal disruptions or loss of momentum during the “hand off.” Even after MUFM submitted the required signatures to the Maine Secretary of State in January 2012 to officially place marriage on the ballot, there continued a predominantly non-lobbying educational c3 effort for several more months.



Throughout the summer of 2012, c3 resources paid for a large number of non-lobbying TV ads. Early absentee voter mail and related robo-calls in late summer and early autumn of 2012 were also paid for with c3 funds. During the late spring and early summer, the c4 substantive content of the outreach increased. The campaign continued to carefully track the number of conversations with any c4

content and allocate expenditures between c3 and c4 accordingly. By July and through to Election Day, almost the entirety of the outreach was accounted to the c4 side of the ledger.

Donor confidence in the Maine team’s fiduciary and regulatory oversight was high, and in turn, there was a confidence that MUFM and its partners were operating within the law and in compliance with federal and state c3 funding rules. Funders saw minimal risk and maximum advantage in making these grants to Maine.

Early unrestricted money matters: Critical to the campaign, and of special note, are the Sussman grants. In total, Donald Sussman, a local businessman and philanthropist, provided the campaign in 2010 and 2011 with approximately \$1.1m in unrestricted c3 funds. Because these funds were given so early, and with relatively no restrictions, the two c3 grantees, GLAD and Equality Maine, could support efforts to test, explore and learn, re-gear new strategies, and clarify underlying assumptions. These resources allowed them to hire professional

“Some of our early attempts at modeling through standard poll-based models...proved to be less fruitful. Were it not for the fact that we already had a year’s worth of [c3-funded] hard field data to compare their suggested models to, we could have easily been led astray.”

- *Mainers United for Marriage 2012 Post Election Analysis*

and high quality staff at the get-go; staff that had the vision and the capacity to transition from exploration to persuasion mode, and, as noted above, the sophistication to leverage public education advocacy into votes.

Messaging and Media

During 2010 and 2011, the research and messaging mandate in Maine was to make sure that, in the words of one member of the campaign, “every dollar in c3 funding was going towards building an infrastructure that would advance a climate supportive of marriage equality.” During this time period, early c3 resources allowed advocates to do extensive qualitative messaging research and field-testing. In partnership with Freedom to Marry and Basic Rights Oregon, WMMM conducted focus groups, online video tests and field-testing that incorporated messaging from a number of research sources, including the Movement Advancement Project, Grove Insight, and the Arcus Foundation. This comparative research allowed advocates to narrow in on universal themes and responses to opposition attacks. It also laid out the foundation for how advocates engaged specific demographic groups within the state.

Grounded in the data produced by this intense c3 research, an extensive public education media outreach strategy was developed and implemented. This included a television, radio and online media campaign designed to tell “real stories about real Mainers” in a way that people could relate. WMMM c3 ads continued to be aired through the summer of 2012. Ads then shifted to a c4 focused designed to help Mainers “complete the journey.”

Outreach and Organizing²

Advocates reported that one of the keenest, but perhaps more obvious, lessons from the 2009 campaign to defend the legislatively approved marriage law was that there tends to be a limited ability to do public education within a “hot” campaign environment. In Maine, advocates had the unique opportunity to run a two-year public education program prior to the 2012 ballot initiative. WMMM’s outreach and organizing was varied, research-based, and grounded in the Maine experiences of 2009 and those of other states in the intervening years, and included a wide variety of tactics, from research to message development, college campus, rural and faith organizing, direct mail, and canvassing.

² For a much deeper quantitative analysis of the four state field campaigns, please see the previously referenced analysis report by Grassroots Solutions, *“The 2012 Marriage Campaigns: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis for Freedom to Marry.”*

Rural: Between 2010 and 2012, much of WMMM’s focus was on rural organizing. Work in the first year was experimental, allowing teams to engage and experiment to identify tactics that had an impact in rural communities.

To the advocates in Maine, this work could not have been done in the climate of a campaign. Unlike urban canvassing, cold-call door knocking was not an option in a rural context. What opened doors were relationships — friends, neighbors who could act as validators and give undecided people permission to think again about the issue. Organizers needed friends to refer friends. The rural organizing teams found that signing statements — letters signed by community members supporting marriage equality and published in local newspapers — were an effective way of creating those connections and starting conversations.

In a state like Maine, where a significant portion of the population lives in a rural setting, there are few choices for how to engage and educate the public. While WMMM’s efforts at community based rural organizing did seem to have impact, it was staffed primarily by volunteers and took place over a long period of time. It would be hard to gauge, therefore, the cost per contact. This only becomes an interesting question in light of anecdotal feedback from advocates who, in contrast, suggested that phones were just as effective with Mainers as face-to-face contact.

Faith: One of the lessons of 2009 was that a “rights and benefits” argument for marriage did not resonate with Mainers. It was confirmed, when outreach began again in 2010, that Mainers, while not an extremely religious people, needed to know how to reconcile support for marriage equality with faith. In fact, according to one advocate, in a vast majority of phone conversation organizers had in 2010 and 2011, a question about faith would inevitably come up.

While faith was appreciated in terms of message development — especially with the encouragement of consultant Amy Simon — it was not a designated, staffed outreach strategy until February 2012 when a part-time Faith Director was hired by Equality Maine. Even when this position and the faith outreach work transitioned to be fully c4 funded a few months later, it was still not part of the leadership circle.

Advocates reflected that up until this point, faith, perhaps, had been confused in their strategic thinking with *religion*. Initial attempts at faith organizing were top down — recruiting congregations to sign on in support and relying on clergy to mobilize congregants to be involved. The rural organizing project included this type of faith organizing as well. What was learned in Maine was that faith engagement was much more successful if done from the bottom up — working with lay leadership, engaging congregation social justice committees, lifting up the voices of the people of faith themselves.

Under the direction of the Faith Director, faith outreach looked to mobilize already existing faith tables like the local Religious Coalition Against Discrimination, to recruit congregations to sign on, and to identify and position people of faith as messengers for why marriage mattered. While these efforts were viewed as a success by WUFM, those closest involved in this outreach did not feel WMMM made the most from this opportunity to engage the LGBT community with people of faith. What frustrated people on the ground most was that engaging communities of faith in any systematic way was not an explicit part of the c3 2010-2011 relationship building/outreach priorities. As one advocate put it “the campaign was so singly focused and short term, but we in the faith coalition knew we had to be about building relationships. Sometimes this culture clash and the driving pace of the campaign setting were hard to navigate without a lot of hurt feelings.”

Final note


Early “commitments” by Sussman caused national groups and funders to take Maine seriously much sooner in the arc of the effort to advance marriage equality. It was clear by the end of 2010 that there would be a “game” in Maine, and groups wanted to be part of it. This early validation by Sussman, Freedom to Marry and CMC strengthened subsequent c3 and c4 fundraising efforts.

In Maine, early c3 money allowed the campaign the time and space to recruit and develop relationships with very high quality professional staff. This resulted in quite strong and trusting relationship between GLAD, EqualityMaine Foundation, funders, and key campaign board members and senior staff. Accordingly, by the time the campaign went into high gear in 2012, everyone was on the same page, decisions and strategies were understood, and the work benefited from these high levels of trust across parties.


Maryland

After an unsuccessful attempt to advance marriage equality in the 2011 legislative session, by early 2012, advocates in Maryland were eager to again make the push for marriage equality. This time the effort was successful, and on March 1, 2012 Governor Martin O'Malley signed The Civil Marriage Protection Act into law. Victory was short-lived, as almost immediately, anti-marriage forces collected enough signatures to place it for referendum, "citizen's veto," on the November 2012 ballot.

Maryland Total Expenditures, 2011-2012: \$6m



Maryland c3 related support, 2009-2012: \$445k



Public Education Funding

Unlike the other three campaigns described in this report, Marylanders for Marriage Equality was run as a solely 501(c)(4) campaign. There was no "official" 501(c)(3) public education strategy initiated by the campaign leadership to run concurrently or parallel to the c4 effort, nor were funds raised to develop such a strategy. This absence of public education and organizing funding, and reasons behind why these funds were not available to MDfME involve a number of complex and disputed factors. Those aside, the impact of this lack of support and validation from potential national and in-state partners placed significant and unique stresses on the campaign, both in terms of the substance of its work, but also

its ability to leverage other funding partners — both c3 and c4.

As already noted, building up to 2012 there was not a distinct MDfME-coordinated public education campaign that advanced why marriage mattered and laid the groundwork for its c4 counterpart. But between 2009 and 2011 there were in fact several c3 grants made to the EqualityMaryland Foundation, the key state equality group, in support of advancing the freedom to marry. In 2009, 2010, and then again

in 2011, the CMC and the Gill Foundation made separate grants to EMF, totaling \$250,000 and \$95,000 respectively.

MDfME campaign staff were aware of these investments, and acknowledged in particular the impact of this early funding on their future organizing work within communities of color. But EqualityMaryland during this time period experienced a number of organizational challenges and lacked the capacity to take on a stronger role within the eventual marriage campaign built around the ballot measure. It is unclear whether or not further investigation might have unearthed a ready alternative to EMF to act as c3 grantee. MDfME was not an option nor did a realistic c3 alternative to EMF come forward that could fill both the public education programming and fundraising roles.

Messaging and Media

There were no c3 direct investments in messaging or media in Maryland that were in parallel to MDfME. As work progressed to develop field and communications strategies, Freedom to Marry shared polling and messaging research with MDfME and included the campaign's senior staff in their cross-campaign calls. Advocates in Maryland were happy for the information, and in particular found value in being connected with their counterparts in the other states campaigns through Freedom to Marry's organized working groups.

Perhaps the most pivotal messaging and media moment for validating to the public why marriage mattered happened outside of the strategies of the campaign or any Maryland-specific actor: President Obama's game-changing May 9, 2012 announcement of support for same-sex marriage. His declaration for marriage equality changed the landscape on this issue immediately and permanently, and all four campaigns — but especially Maryland with its large African American community — were now provided with a very high-profile validator of marriage equality. The details of the President's statement also reflected and enforced the emerging values messaging that seemed to resonate best in the state — that this was not only about rights, love and commitment, but also about treating people fairly.

"It wouldn't dawn on [Malia and Sasha Obama] that somehow their friends' parents would be treated differently. It doesn't make sense to them and frankly, that's the kind of thing that prompts a change in perspective."

- President Obama, May 9, 2012

Outreach and Organizing

Communities of Color: Past c3 programming by EMF, according to MDfME staff, identified specific communities that could potentially be supportive and receptive to organizing. The primary example of this was past EMF’s support of the Maryland Black Family Alliance, a network of “straight, black allies who are faith leaders, elected officials, social workers, artists, professors, activists, attorneys, mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers and friends who all believe injustice for all of Maryland families — including those headed by same-sex households.”³ While not an extremely active group in 2012 in its own right, the Alliance provided MDfME quick access to members of target communities that were willing to act on the campaign’s behalf.

The overall impact of this c3 funding as a means of developing an enduring platform that could be leveraged for future public education was limited, however. By early 2012, EMF was nearly bankrupt and had just brought in its 3rd executive director in as many years. This prohibited the group from advancing outreach as had been hoped and deepening its cross-alliance efforts. This instability also negated EMF’s ability to act as a validator and advocate for the campaign with national funders and Freedom to Marry.

Cross-Issue Alliances: The only other stream of c3 support given to Maryland by national funders was funding in 2012 by the Gill Foundation for alliance building between the LGBT and Latino communities. In addition to the question of marriage, on November 6th Maryland voters were also asked to decide whether undocumented immigrants who met specific criteria could be eligible for in-state college tuition (Maryland’s “Dream Act”). With support from Gill and Freedom to Marry, in August EMF and CASA de Maryland, the leading immigrant rights group in the state, jointly launched the *Familia es Familia* initiative. CASA was funded to educate Latino voters about the importance of marriage equality by lifting up the stories of Latino LGBT families. For Equality Maryland, these funds supported its efforts to educate LGBT voters about the importance of immigrant education by highlighting the stories of undocumented LGBT youth.

There was no real sense from those advocates interviewed (both inside as well as outside of MDfME) as to the impact of the *Familia es Familia* work, nor does any quantitative data exist that would shed light on how this work changed hearts and minds within Maryland’s Latino community. Both MDfMU and the Dream campaign disowned the initiative. MDfME did not identify Latinos — who make up a small percentage of the voting population in the state — as a target constituency. In addition, the Dream Act campaign was already contending with a potentially fractious coalition of liberals and conservatives. Tagging on an LGBT

³ Maryland Black Family Alliance, http://www.marylandbfa.org/about_us

angle on top of that could do harm to the campaign’s cohesion (especially with the Catholic Church being such a prominent presence on the Dream campaign’s board.) There was a feeling among the Dream leadership that there was inadequate time between the end of August and Election Day to have those conversations necessary — especially with its Catholic and Evangelical members — to demonstrate the value added of an alliance between Dream and Marriage.

Freedom to Marry staff remain resolute that the *Familia es Familia* work in Maryland was strategic and an important element to advancing why marriage matters, particularly in communities of color. While no one involved with the campaign denied the need for, or future potential of, cross-issue alliances building, this was seen as too little and too late to have a real impact on the outcomes of either campaign.

Final note

All analysis of the efficacy of the campaigns conducted by HRC, Freedom to Marry, and the LGBT community in November’s ballot victory must be considered in the light of the extraordinary role played by Governor Martin O’Malley. It was his pollsters that refined the messages that worked for target constituencies, and his chief strategist that backstopped the campaign’s organizing and mobilization strategies. It was his patronage that brought out the Democratic Party machine to mobilize the vote for marriage and his chief fundraiser (and his own solicitations) that brought in significant resources during the final months of the campaign. As was the case with Governor Andrew Cuomo in New York, Governor O’Malley himself put all the power and influence of his office behind passing the marriage equality vote.⁴ It was arguably his commitment that put victory within reach.

“When O’Malley engages, he engages to win and nothing short...”

⁴ For more information, please see the CMC-commissioned report “*Enacting Marriage Equality in New York State: How it all came together.*” (Barbara Masters, February 29, 2012)

Minnesota

Unlike the other three ballot measures discussed in this report, advocates in Minnesota faced the challenge of *defeating* at the ballot box a proposed constitutional amendment to ban marriage for same sex couples. In effect, the goal

was to affirm marriage equality by saying “no,” in the hopes that outright access to the freedom to marry could then be achieved at some later time.

In November 2010 the Tea Party took effective control over both houses of the Minnesota legislature and quickly prioritized its agenda to address what were perceived as the three most pressing social issues: constitutionally “protecting” marriage; ending abortion; and advancing strict voter identification laws.


Two local groups, the LGBT OutFront MN and the progressive alliance Project 515, supported by Freedom to Marry staff, closely monitored what was happening in the legislature. Despite their efforts, in this conservative climate, legislation to constitutionally restrict marriage

to a man and a woman easily gained passage, and by May 2011 it was clear there would be a constitutional referendum on marriage on the November 2012 ballot.


Public Education Funding

In response to this now eventual ballot fight, Project 515 and OutFront began to organize public education and engagement, and in mid-2011, along with local


Minnesota Total Expenditures, 2011-2012: \$14,554,000



Total c3 Funding, 2011-2012: \$954,780



Minnesota Campaign-reported c3 Expenditures, 2011-2012



advocates, helped to launch the formal c4 campaign, MN United for all Families. But the political circumstances in the state, as well as polling data collected that summer, gave few cause to think a win at the ballot likely. Freedom to Marry did provide both the public education initiatives and the MN United campaign with support during this period in the form of staffing, research and cash. There had never been a

strong history of national funders directly engaging in marriage work in Minnesota, and the surprise, defensive nature of the battle at hand did not enhance the chances for new, significant levels of such involvement. Internal challenges among some of the groups on the ground in the state had also hindered potential earlier involvement by national funders. Despite investments by Freedom to Marry and local funders, this lack of enthusiasm among national donors resulted in very limited access to c3 funding for public education work in 2011.

A significant portion of the total c3 funding to support marriage equality in Minnesota did not begin to materialize until 2012, when, with the assistance of Freedom to Marry, OutFront and Project 515 jointly requested and received funding from the CMC. The approval of these grants (with the strong championing by Freedom to Marry) was critical validation that grounded both the subsequent c3 and c4 fundraising of the campaign, nationally as well as locally.

Messaging and Media

With limited time and money, and no Maine-like wealth of state-specific public education research and testing upon which to rely, MN United Campaign Manager Richard Carlbom and his staff in 2011 were faced with the challenge of developing messaging that worked with multiple Minnesota communities. With Freedom to Marry's guidance and experiences, MN United quickly understood that to win, the campaign needed to address Minnesotans' core values questions in its conversations and messaging *before* they could advocate for a vote. They also looked at the

The key success of the public education campaign was the ability to begin our television advertising 12 weeks before Election Day. Our first ad, titled Grandparents, ran for three weeks and achieved a saturation level in the two largest media markets in Minnesota.

- MN United Final Report 2.0, page 20

experiences of Prop 8 in California, another “vote no” effort. They knew that the message thread used there — that it was a “bad idea to amend a constitution” — would not work in Minnesota. The c3 funding received in 2011 provided modest capacity (funded in part by CMC, Gill and Carlton) to support in-state research, polling, analysis and message testing that would later prove invaluable to MN United as this Minnesota message was developed.

Almost two-thirds of the c3 monies received (including almost all of the Mossier Foundation money, given through Freedom to Marry) went to the research, production and broadcasting of television ads, which ran from the beginning of August to mid-September 2012. (Beginning in mid-September and continuing to Election Day, all media supported by the campaign was paid for by c4 funds.)

Due to limited resources, the campaign decided to run one single c3 television ad. MN United’s 2011 research told them not to run away from the marriage issue, but to instead work on centering messages around “how does this vote define me?” and “who am I as a Minnesotan?” narratives. They chose an ad that featured a real Minnesota couple, “grandparents,” speaking about their relationship and the core values of the campaign — love, commitment and responsibility. Freedom to Marry played an important supportive role to the campaign in the production of, and leveraging financing for, this ad. By all accounts, this was an extremely important and effective investment. Audiences knew the ad, and remembered it. As a result, organizers, phone bankers and canvassers were provided with a “live” platform from which to start the c4 conversations on marriage and the impact of voting “no.”

Outreach and Organizing

A small portion of the early 2012 investments by the campaign in communities of faith and color were c3. This use of c3 helped the campaign set the tone for broader values conversations as well as the eventual “no” vote advocacy within these specific communities.

Faith: Based on the research done in 2011 and the experiences of past campaigns, MN United understood that they could not let the opposition “own” faith, and that they needed to be able to raise up and organize a complex array of faith voices capable of giving Minnesotans “permission” to support marriage equality.

As such, high priority was given within the c3 outreach strategy to the development of a faith team. The faith director was a member of the senior campaign staff who participated in all strategy conversations.

“In both communities of faith and color, we had to be very forthright of what we were talking about. Both communities had other priorities on the ballot. And we had to early on get people to understand that we were asking them to vote ‘no.’”

In total, the faith team was made up of nine staff. Other than one staffer who was loaned to the campaign from HRC, all staff had strong ties to the Minnesota communities. Several staff were explicitly assigned to Catholic or Lutheran outreach, as the two largest and most significant religions affiliations in the state.

C3 resources were initially used in early 2012 to bring this team together and to begin some of the community level engagement. But quickly for strategic reasons — and probably due in some part to the lack of c3 funds available to the campaign as well — the faith team moved to purely c4 engagement.

There were, however, prior c3 faith-related investments that benefited the campaign. A number of denominational LGBT groups had already done groundwork in the state and were working and connected with the churches. OutFront MN had a faith table and existing relationships with local faith leaders. Arguably as a result of the prior relationship-building, a number of Church bodies independently voted to oppose the marriage amendment. Five out of the six Lutheran Synods in Minnesota, for example, voted to encourage their membership to vote “no.”

Communities of Color: In retrospect, the campaign understands that it would have done better to have a more intentional and “organic” approach to engagement with communities of color. MN United and its c3 partners OutFront and Project 515 invested more money in COC work than any other campaign in the state, but unfortunately they didn’t establish relationships with community leaders early enough to ensure that contributions were recognizable. And importantly, those communities were already engaged in working to defeat the other proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot, which would require photo identification before voting, something of higher priority to COC than marriage equality.

“As statewide campaigns go, MN United did well in establishing credibility with communities of color. But we were put at a significant disadvantage because leaders of these communities wanted our attention on the other ballot initiative and we didn’t have the capacity to give. We as a campaign just did not anticipate that. We were seen as taking progressive money away from these issues of real import to communities of color. Communities saw their leaders publically caring about marriage, but not their own issues, and this caused tensions. This is definitely a place where, with a bit more time and c3 money, we could have done a lot.”

Final note


The luxury of hindsight notwithstanding, the timing of Minnesota’s public education engagement here surfaces a number of questions. By May 2011, advocates knew with a high degree of certainty that there would be a ballot referendum in November 2012. Yet a campaign manager was not hired until November 2011 and a focused public education strategy did not commence until early 2012. Similarly, there was no organized outreach to new c3 donors. Consistent with other observations in all four campaigns noted here, the loss of those six months of comprehensive, coordinated public education carried a high price — especially in engaging communities of color and of faith.

Washington

In 2007, the legislature in Washington State passed Domestic Partnership recognition for its LGBT community. The bill was significantly strengthened in 2008 to include all the rights that Washington provided married couples. Opponents placed the measure on the ballot and, after a heated campaign,


Washington's public voted to keep this pro-equality measure in place with 53% support. Advocates hoped to quickly move to full marriage equality in 2010, yet political intelligence and depressing polling numbers suggested scant hope that it would be feasible to do so. In 2011, as a result of initial encouraging polling, state advocates agreed to proceed with efforts to win and hold marriage. A group of key stakeholders launched the *Washington United for Marriage* ("WUFM") coalition on November 14, 2011, to advance the effort.

WUFM took the lead in launching the legislative effort. With Governor Christine Gregoire making marriage equality a top priority of her legislative agenda, the bill was introduced and passed easily. Opponents quickly placed the law on the ballot for a voter veto.



WUFM assumed from the outset that any success in the legislature would be challenged by referendum. With this in mind, WUFM was designed to be both a legislative and ballot campaign. Zach Silk was hired as campaign manager in late 2011. Silk designed a campaign that could seamlessly shift from legislative to ballot and that ran on the strengths of both a c3 and a c4 operation.

Public Education Funding:



The initial “face” of public education and outreach to advance marriage equality in Washington (as well as the historic recipient of c3 funding from the CMC and other national funders) was the statewide equality group Equal Rights Washington. In 2011, ERW again approached the national funders on behalf of advancing marriage equality in the state, in anticipation of the 2012 ballot. By all accounts, however, ERW was regarded as

functionally weak, with low capacity, and not having the confidence of the other coalition members to be responsible for the c3 campaign. This was accurately noted in the CMC review of their application, and support was denied in early 2012.

WUFM was well into campaign mode by this point in time, and it was evident to its board and leadership that the immediate implementation of a public education effort was critical to a win. Freedom to Marry and CMC staff took a leadership role here, and worked closely with the campaign, a small group of national funders, and the Seattle-based Pride Foundation, to develop a public education funding plan and proposal. In this revised formation, Pride Foundation was established as the grantee for c3 funding. CMC and several national funders responded, and public education money started to flow into the state that March.

As noted above, public education funding over the full course of the campaign totaled just under \$1.5m. Unlike Maine, these funds came relatively late in the “arc” of the campaign, the bulk of which only began to arrive less than nine months prior to the actual vote. To many advocates on the ground in Washington, the initial denial of support from the CMC and the challenges it felt from Freedom to Marry were not without cost. They felt hindered in their ability to engage in what they knew was desperately needed public education, and handicapped in their attempts to connect with other potential c3 and c4 donors by this lack of validation. While most agree that the CMC did the right thing by denying a grant to ERW, advocates felt that the initial funding planning process was too hinged to the ERW — as the state’s equality group — as the only “correct” group to request

support. This was worked out to everyone's satisfaction, with Pride representing the best grantee to accomplish public education goals. But as was experienced in Maryland, there was this initial understanding in Washington that the CMC would only engage with local equality groups, regardless of the capacity and appropriateness of these groups to act as partners in the overall advocacy effort. The campaign was in some ways taxed by this misunderstanding.

Messaging and Media

Approximately two-thirds of the total c3 funds raised supported the testing, production and airing of two non-lobbying c3 television ads. Research and message testing for these ads began in late April 2012, and the ads were run between July 27 and September 3. Ads were aired in media markets covering 92% of the state population. Amy Simon and the research and experiences of Freedom to Marry were pivotal to helping shape the messaging and media outreach. WUFM, as part of its own internal assessment, was able to gauge the impact of this public education strategy. *Through its analysis of polling and data, WUFM was able to establish that its public education media work contributed to a one to three percentage increase in support for marriage equality statewide.*

501(c)(3) funding also supported outreach and messaging to Washington State's COC media. This work was done under the direction of the Western States Center's Why Marriage Matters Washington initiative, and is discussed below.

Outreach & Organizing:

Second to media, the other significant 501(c)(3) resources funded community outreach and organizing. Thomas Wheatley of Freedom to Marry, working closely with the WUFM Campaign Manager, oversaw much of the public education initiatives.

Three target demographics were identified by WUFM for public education organizing: families with children; people of faith; and communities of color.

Families with Children: To defend against the anticipated opposition ads that messaged "exposing threats" to children and parental rights, one component of the Washington strategy was to increase support within the parent — and especially mother — demographic. While some inroads were made, this was perhaps the least effective of the campaign's outreach work because it was never able to establish traction with busy parents to build the degree of conversations and relationship necessary to add marriage equality to their usually non-political agendas.

Campaign staff suggested that if they were to do this work over, they would focus their attentions on equipping and supporting LGBT parenting groups to take advantage of already existing relationships and linkages into these communities so that they could provide “witness” to why the freedom to marry was important for LGBT families.

Faith: The campaign ran both a c3 and a c4 faith outreach strategy. With c3 funds, the Pride Foundation hired a Washington- based seminary graduate as Faith Outreach Specialist in April 2012. She was supported half-time by a staffer who also supported the above-mentioned families/children work. The c4 Faith Director, a pastor formerly from Washington State, came on board in July 2012.

Faith outreach strategies in Washington State benefited from a legacy of faith organizing by the LGBT community on nondiscrimination and domestic partnership issues. According to campaign staff, they were able to engage a faith community that was already somewhat organized and ready to be activated. However, WUFM’s own efforts to develop relationships with those existing networks proved to be challenging. There was a tension — experienced in other states as well — between coordinating the methods of faith organizing with the campaign itself.

“Over and over again, we found that the more personal the contact with faith leaders and their congregants, the more likely they were to be supportive and take on additional roles in our collective outreach efforts. One to one relationship development was key, and [if done] inviting communities and their leaders into the conversation about the freedom to marry was consistently met with interest...”

Work in the faith communities, they found, happened best if left to flow at its own pace and within the mechanics of the various alliances and denominational structures (in essence, to run as a campaign within a campaign.) At times this was in direct conflict to the strategic and real-time demands of a campaign to move votes.

Reflecting on this, the faith staff did not feel like part of the campaign’s leadership team or strategic decision-making process. All too often they felt they were there to “produce a collar” as part of a larger strategy. In fairness, both sides acknowledged this tension. As reflected in the campaign’s final report,

“The Faith Outreach team did not sit at the senior campaign management table. They ended up being a large and valuable program, but they continued to operate under the Outreach Director. It may make sense to bring the large, defined Outreach teams into the senior campaign management system.”

Faith organizing was also impacted by the lack of access to early c3 funding. Here again, outreach, access to meetings, and scheduling was hindered by the summer months, when on any typical Sunday, attendance is low and fewer events are planned. All staff working on faith organizing strongly emphasized the limitations of this short window of work, and how important and necessary time is to create the trust and space for personal relationships and advocacy to be advanced.

Communities of Color: Funded through the Pride Foundation, The Western States Center was tasked to do public education and organizing in communities of color. WSC’s “Why Marriage Matters Washington” (“WMMW”) initiative worked from May 1 to September 30 2012 to raise the visibility of LGBT people and the freedom to marry in the four key communities of color in the state — African American, Asian and Pacific Islander, Latino, and Native American. Western State’s goal was to mobilize trusted organizations and individuals of color within their own communities, including: hiring local, culturally competent staff from each of the four communities; soliciting endorsements from leading state people of color organizations and community leaders; elevating the voice of LGBT people of color within their own communities; and developing media outreach tailored linguistically and culturally to communities of color.

WSC worked hard to deliver on its outcomes by building networks, conducting trainings and implementing community-specific initiatives. But with a May 1st start in an election year with many competing local, state and federal campaigns, WSC had difficulty finding qualified organizers in each of these communities. The hiring process was slower than desired, and often resulted in candidates that had some, but not all, of the necessary skills. A viable in-state candidate for the senior position of Statewide Coordinator, in fact, was never identified. This oversight and coordination role was assumed by default by WSC staff based in Oregon.

Hence, while WSC’s goal was to receive endorsement for the freedom to marry by 70 organizations that primarily serve communities of color, moving organizations to support was a much longer process than anticipated. On the other hand, however, WMMW had great success with individual leaders of color, resulting in more than 200 community leaders publically sharing their support for the freedom to marry.

WSC’s creation and use of culturally and linguistically appropriate educational and press materials that incorporated the values and experiences of local communities of color was very effective. These materials were used extensively by the campaign to train and support volunteers and endorsers to provide the talking points and messaging consistent with the overall campaign, but relevant — both culturally as well as linguistically — with the community.

These staffing challenges resulted in an unanticipated budget surplus of c3 funds that was then used to engage ethnic media. Print ads featuring LGBT people and their families ran in three Spanish, two API and two African American papers for several weeks. The WMMW ran close to 2,000 c3 issue education ads on Spanish radio across the state during the last week of September and the first two weeks in October.

Unfortunately, no real quantitative data exists that would help us understand the exact impact of these investments in COC and COF. Little, if any, polling data exists that represents the attitudes in COC communities towards the freedom to marry prior to the interventions of WSC.

Final Note

Western States Center's role in Washington raises a number of issues that help illustrate the challenges of funding c3 public education initiatives.

1. *Were local options exhausted?* There was disappointment that the task of engaging Washington's communities of color had been entrusted to a group from outside of the state when, in the opinion of some advocates, local groups had the capacity to do the work.
2. *How do you make connections and access relationships?* WSC's out-of-state status was perceived as a negative factor in recruiting staff. That, in turn, hindered COC engagement because WSC did not have deep enough relationships within the state.
3. *What should an outsider's relationship be with campaign leadership?* The designation by a national funder of WSC was also seen as counter to the spirit of how a campaign should be funded. In an ideal setting, Pride and the campaign senior staff would have preferred to jointly determine the best vendor for this work. Being "told" who to work with by an outsider — for better or worse — tainted that relationship from the start.

Observations on the Impact and Efficacy of C3 Funding

Public Education effectively moves hearts and minds.

501(c)(3) funding that produced well-researched and tested strategies to educate the public as to why marriage matters contributed to changing attitudes. This funding, without question, provided state groups with the capacity to develop and tailor these strategies. It supported multiple levels of engagement by advocates that for some changed minds, but for all “loosened the soil” for continued engagement. Access to c3 funding increased advocates ability to:

- Support research, focus groups, and polling to understand what resonates with the public and specific target populations and what a good and effective public education strategy is in the context of a specific state; and,
- Develop relationships and alliances, creating shared understanding with the general public and target communities of color, faith and other constituencies.

“Never underestimate the degree to which work in communities of faith and color is relationship based, and plan early and accordingly.”

“Home grown” public education promised better impact.

Stories from folks like me: While expensive, airing well-researched public education television ads was a critically important tool in changing attitudes towards marriage equality. In all four states, using local voices and stories to help educate why marriage mattered had a high degree of impact, and changed the dynamics of the local conversation. Funding that lifted up local leaders and stakeholders, veterans and older adults as permission givers also provided a high return.

Leveraging local, existing networks: The work to advance why marriage matters took on new energy in a state if advocates could hook into pre-existing networks and alliances. Be they a local LGBT parenting group, the local chapter of Lutherans United, or the NAACP, public education campaigns could go deeper and have greater impact if these existing networks and relationships were engaged.

Power dynamics impacted the efficacy of funding.

Empowering local leadership: The directive nature of public education efforts and campaigns requires that its leadership be given the authority to lead. Outside stakeholders — funders and national organizations — should poke and prod and stress test in the course of meeting their own standards of due diligence. But in the examples of these four campaigns, public education funding had the most effect when leadership on the ground had a voice in how resources were allocated and prioritized.

Identifying c3 grantee groups: There was clearly confusion in the states about who could apply for support from the CMC and other national funders. This confusion resulted in frayed relationships, organizational stress, and most unfortunately, delays or decreases in access to funds. The high degree of engagement by the CMC and funders in Washington, for example, was a good example of how a wider range of grantees might be developed in states going forward.

The power of validation: Second perhaps to Freedom to Marry, the CMC is the most important validator of a marriage equality effort. CMC's actions, site visits, official communications and off-hand comments are noticed and impact how other funders, potential partners and allies view these efforts.

Ghosts of Christmas Past: The shadows of previous ballot losses loomed heavy over all four campaigns and impacted decisions by funders, major donors, and national groups on public education efforts and campaign efforts. What was learned in 2012, however, is that attitudes change, validators emerge, and that regardless of past experiences, micro-targeting messages and outreach makes a difference. Given the marriage movement's many victories of the past year, this particular challenge may never emerge in quite the same way again.

Need for acknowledgement and ownership: Many of the tensions between national capacity providers such as Freedom to Marry, HRC, NGLTF, and others, and local groups grew out of the very honest organizational need of all organizations in the mix to be seen by current and future funders, media and others, as agents of change and creators of

“From April (when we purchased our first airtime) to October (when we purchased our final round of airtime) the Cost per Point (CPP) in the Portland media market increased from \$89 to \$160... Mainers United purchased broadcast time in Bangor for \$83 CPP in September, but paid \$125 CPP during late October.”

- *Mainers United for Marriage 2012 Post Election Analysis, pg. 12*

impact. Unfortunately, at times this struggle for attribution negatively impacted or delayed the contributions of all groups involved.

The funding process impacted efficacy.

Early c3 made media dollars go farther: Media research, testing, and production take time and requires the employment of very specialized skills and capacities. Media also represents advance work that can be largely supported with early c3 funding. States could also buy considerably more airtime at a cheaper rate if they had the resources in hand to purchase early, adding to the potential impact of c3 funding.

C3 Investments in state and national research and centralized data consolidation are paying off: The public education and engagement efforts in these four states were effective and efficient because they leveraged the experiences and knowledge of previous c3 efforts.

Flexible funding: The three public education campaigns observed were staffed by professionals working in partnership with strong governing boards. Together, they did an extraordinary job of prioritizing and maximizing c3 investments in dynamic and fluid political environments. For the most part, c3 funders were experienced by the advocates as conscious of this need for fluidity and opportunism. The funders' willingness to work with advocates as budget priorities evolved made them effective and appreciated partners to the work.

“Earmarked money by funders does not reflect an understanding of how campaigns work. In particular, earmarking pass-through to groups not designated by the campaign as partners or best contractors for the job to be done can cause damage and delay.”

Pivoting from c3 to c4 engagement: In the three states that had deliberate public education campaigns, federal and state law mandated that a “bright line” be established between that work to educate the public as to why marriage mattered, and those activities initiated to mobilize the public to act. For groups with both a c3 and c4 side, this could be done with a minimal expense or loss of momentum through employing a high degree of fiduciary oversight to expenditures. But in some circumstances, this need for distinctness would necessitate that relationships developed in a target community by a c3 group during the education phase be passed on to a completely different organization to “bring home the vote.” This had the potential to diminish ground gained through c3 investments.

In addition, where there was local sophistication and funder confidence in local advocates' ability to maximize c3 resources, less inefficiency existed and momentum was maintained. Establishing a shared understanding between funder,

grantee, and advocates of the limits and restrictions of state and federal law, and identifying voices of expertise acceptable to all parties who can quickly mediate any disputes, would safeguard the efficacy and impact of this funding.

Relationships matter.

Conversations take time, as do relationships: Regardless of the demographic or constituency, supporting public education efforts that forge relationships and lift up common values platforms are key to moving people to support the freedom to marry. In all four states, c3 investments that supported personal contact and extended conversations were extremely effective in changing hearts and minds. But this relationship and alliance building is a much longer-term challenge than that which can be fully achieved within the short window of a campaign. And we saw in the four states that the highest return came when these contacts were initiated by local messengers and peers. Minnesotans wanted to hear from Minnesotans, not New Yorkers, why marriage matters. Lutherans want to hear from Lutherans why supporting marriage equality does not conflict with their shared faith.

Relationships that live outside and beyond the campaign:

As part of the formative work in the campaign, we interviewed more than 140 leaders of color...that held particular sway or significance in their communities. These interviews shaped the prioritization of the initial outreach. The interviewees, all grass-tops leaders, expressed their personal support for LGBT issues and the freedom to marry — and also shared that they had not been regularly engaged by the LGBT community about agenda, priorities, and shared mutual interest. The lack of relationships between LGBT leaders and leaders of color ...hindered our work and had a major impact on our ability to reach our goal...Relationship building and on-going dialogue across sectors should be an area of future priority for the LGBT movement in Washington.

- Final Report to Pride Foundation from Western States Center on WMMW, page 3

A Faith Seat at the Table: The capacity to engage on issues of faith, even for notoriously non-religious Mainers, played a critical role in the efficacy of the public education persuasion work in all four states. When a c3 faith education and outreach team was represented at the senior management table, the campaign was better able to fully integrate faith messages into its public education work, benefiting outreach results.

Intersectional Strategies: Teams working to engage communities of color were also sensitive to the role of faith in these communities. The leaders and people of influence identified in communities of color were, for the most part, faith leaders. Hence, persuasion in these communities is not solely tied to a race dynamic but a multifaceted

conversation at the intersection of faith, culture and race.

This intersectional approach should be explored further, and adequate resources provided to research teams to understand how to best leverage this intersection.

“It was important to have a direct piece of our work engage at the intersection of faith and communities of color. Because of the role that faith leaders of color play in both communities of color and white communities, greater attention should have been given to this area with more time and capacity. Additionally, regular coordination between the campaign’s faith and POC work would only have strengthened both efforts.”

What we know we don’t know.

C₃, Ceteris Paribus: Good polling coupled with clearly defined public education campaigns in Maine and Washington allowed us to draw a causal relationship between c₃ funding and changes in attitudes toward marriage equality. *In all four states, in fact, strong and encouraging indicators of impact, efficacy and the contributions of c₃ funding were found.* But in the dynamic environments of these four state campaigns, “holding all things constant” to establish *attribution* of c₃ grants versus c₄ investments proved too lofty a goal. The c₃ work reviewed for this report was done in the real world, and the strategies and tactics to educate the public on why marriage mattered were at times buoyed (and at others hindered) by individuals, media or events initiated outside those efforts. President Obama’s May 2012 endorsement of marriage equality and its impact on the African American community is perhaps the clearest example this.

Absence of community data: In all four states, funders placed a high priority on public education and organizing in communities of color and faith. However, little quantitative data was produced from any of the campaigns that could clearly illustrate the impact of this funding. In truth we have little real empirical data to understand the impact

“We really don’t have any idea if the money spent in COC did anything, since there was no prior polling data and no oversampling of COC done by any of the other polling. Given the cost of polling, we could not have done it ourselves, and the cost of polling would have been out of proportion with what we had to spend on c₃ programming.”

of those investments. Baselines did not exist, and no polling or oversampling of polling was performed that specifically isolated attitudes in these communities to then compare with baseline data had it existed.

Future funding considerations could help to assess future impact. Resources might be prioritized to clean the online voter file (VAN) data so that outreach and engagement in communities of color and faith will be most culturally appropriate and effective and can be better tracked. While costly, an increase in c3 funding of polling and research specific to these communities is really the only way to access the data necessary to understand impact of this public education work. Advocates and pollsters should be encouraged and supported to prioritize this data collection while funders must determine if an investment to support such efforts meets any reasonable cost benefit analysis.

Evaluation as a reflection: Because this evaluation was initiated after the fact, the analysis relied, by necessity, on those metrics and monitoring tools (and data) produced by the four campaigns and a small handful of other key stakeholders *independent of this inquiry*. By default, this assessment of the impact and efficacy of the c3 funding significantly reflects the insights and recall of key stakeholders, in addition to the existing data.

Interview List

EqualityMaine Foundation

- Betsy Smith, Executive Director

Equality Maryland

- Carrie Evans, Executive Director

Freedom to Marry

- Marc Solomon, National Campaign Director
- Shawn Werner, Director of Political Operations
- Thomas Wheatley, Director of Organizing
- Evan Wolfson, President
- Thalia Zepatos, Director of Public Engagement

Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD)

- Carisa Cunningham, Director, Public Affairs & Education

GLAAD

- Ross Murray, Dir. of News and Faith Initiatives

Grassroots Solutions

- Dan Cramer, Co-Founder

Human Rights Campaign

- Marty Rouse, National Field Director
- Sultan Shakir, Director, Youth & Campus Outreach

Mainers United for Marriage

- Ryan Brown, Deputy Field Director
- Sue Gabrielson, Faith Director
- Matt McTighe, Campaign Manager
- Amy Mellow, Field Director

Marylanders for Marriage Equality

- Linda Eberhart, Chief Strategist
- Josh Levin, Campaign Manager

Minnesotans United for All Families

- Richard Carlbom, Campaign Manager
- Peggy Flannagan, Communities of Color Leader
- Ryan Greenwood, Field Director

Pride Foundation

- Kris Hermanns, Executive Director

Washington United for Marriage

- Adrian Matanza, Field Director
- Debra Peevey, Faith Director
- Zach Silk, Campaign Manager

Western States Center

- Kalpana Krishnamurthy, Program Officer
- Kelley Weigel, Executive Director